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Motivated by the analogy which holds within the context of discovery 
between mathematics and physics, we aim to show that there is a con-
nection between two fi elds within the context of justifi cation too. Based 
on the careful analysis of examples from science (especially within the 
domain of physics) we suggest that the logic of scientifi c research, which 
might appear as enumerative induction, is deduction, and we propose it 
to be universal generalization inference rule. Our main argument closely 
follows the analysis of the structure of physical theory proposed by theo-
retical physicist Eugene P. Wigner.
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1. Introduction—context of discovery 
vs. context of justifi cation
While it might seem unproblematic to defend the view that the analogy 
between mathematics and the natural sciences holds in the context of 
discovery, the idea to expand such an analogy to the context of justifi -
cation seems to be far more problematic. We shall fi rst introduce some 
preliminaries, that we shall take for granted in this paper and then 
present our main thesis.
We take the underlying ontology in the philosophy of mathematics 
to be a version of (standard) platonism but platonism in the philosophy 
of mathematics won’t be discussed in this paper. The development of 
mathematical knowledge as well as the process of discovery in the nat-
ural sciences can be standardly analysed from different perspectives: 
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we might decide to opt for the cognitive science orientated research 
or a computationally orientated research, or a historically orientated 
research. In the context of the examples we further analyse we fi nd the 
historically orientated research most appropriate.
Within the descriptive epistemic context there were offered three 
main epistemic routes: (1) perception—both visual and platonic; (2) ex-
perimentation and (3) positing (Trobok 2018). For each of these epis-
temic paths in mathematical research Trobok shows there is a coun-
terpart in the domain of research in the natural sciences. As far as the 
underlying logic within the context of discovery goes, it is important to 
underline the difference between formal proofs in mathematics and the 
heuristic explanatory and exploratory procedures. Lakatos emphati-
cally stresses the difference between formal proofs in mathematics and 
the heuristics of mathematical discovery (Lakatos 1976). Once such 
a distinction is brought to surface, the heuristics of mathematics and 
that in physics turn out to be analogous (Trobok 2018).
The question at this point is: How and to which extent, if at all, 
could the analogy (that holds between mathematics and the natural 
sciences in the context of discovery) be expanded to the context of justi-
fi cation? Namely, as Pòlya underlines:
…many mathematical results were found by induction fi rst and proved 
later. Mathematics presented with rigor is a systematic deductive science 
but mathematics in the making is an experimental inductive science. […] 
In mathematics as in the physical sciences we may use observation and 
induction to discover general laws. But there is a difference. In the physical 
sciences, there is no higher authority than observation and induction but in 
mathematics there is such an authority: rigorous proof. (Pòlya 1945: 117)
While in the context of discovery of both mathematics and physics we 
have reasons to accept Pòlya’s view (Trobok 2018), the aim of this paper 
is to go one step further and show why Pòlya’s view within the context 
of justifi cation is not accurate. The aim is to show that, not just the 
two domains are analogous within the descriptive epistemic context, 
but that the analogy could be expanded to the context of justifi cation as 
well. When focusing on the context of justifi cation, we shall confi ne our 
research to the third epistemic path as above presented: the experiment.
2. Context of justifi cation specifi ed
In the domain of mathematics, Frege nicely explains what character-
ises the context of justifi cation in his famous Grundlagen paragraph:
…it is in the nature of mathematics always to prefer proof, where proof is 
possibile, to any confi rmation by induction. […] The aim of proof is, in fact, 
not merely to place the truth of a proposition beyond all doubt, but also to 
afford us insight into the dependence of truths upon one another. After we 
have convinced ourselves that a boulder is immovable, by trying unsuccess-
fully to move it, there remains the further question, what is it that supports 
it so securely? (Frege 1884/1967: §2)
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Let us analyse more closely the mainstream view regarding the differ-
ence between mathematics and the natural sciences within the context 
of justifi cation according to which:
The status of mathematical knowledge […] appears to differ from the status 
of knowledge in the natural sciences. The theories of the natural sciences 
appear to be less certain and more open to revision than mathematical theo-
ries. (Horsten 2017) 
We shall try to show such a view being fl awed by concentrating our 
line of argumentation on the notion of experiment. The standard view 
is that experiments belong to the empirical sciences, i.e. to the sphere 
of practical research. Experiments are practical procedures generally 
done by researchers in laboratories. Hence, what happens in experi-
mental science might seem at fi rst sight to be remote from the standard 
mathematical practice, mathematics being an armchair activity. And 
even if someone like Putnam (Putnam 1979: xi) admits that there are 
mathematical procedures that could be labelled as experiments (e.g. 
the adoption of the axiom of choice), experiments do not belong to the 
mathematical domain.
Standardly, experiments play several roles in science: we use them 
to test theories, to call for a new theory, to help us determine the struc-
ture or mathematical form of a theory, or to provide evidence for the 
entities involved in a theory (Franklin and Perović 2019). They hence 
belong to the intersection of the context of discovery and the context of 
justifi cation. At fi rst sight, someone might complain that experiments 
are practical procedures done in laboratories and that nothing in the 
mathematical domain can be analogous to such procedures, especially 
given the a priori nature of mathematical research. A closer analysis of 
the concept of experiment will show us, though, that the way we are ac-
customed to perceiving experiments does not correspond with neither 
the nature nor the role that experiments have played throughout the 
history of natural sciences (especially physics).
Galileo Galilei, the father of experimental physics, includes in his 
(Galilei 1638) the taxonomy of experiments. There are, according to 
Galileo, three types of experiments: real, imaginary and thought ex-
periments. The real are those that have been performed in practice, 
the imaginary are those that could have been performed but haven’t 
yet been, while the thought experiments are those that could not pos-
sibly have been performed due to the lack of technology or because 
impossible in principle. What is of interest to us is the fact that thought 
experiments are not marginal for the development of physical theo-
ries. Quite the contrary, such experiments have played a major role in 
the development of scientifi c theories in the work of Galileo, Newton, 
Einstein, Heisenberg et al. Let us mention some of the most famous 
thought experiments: Galileo’s experiment with the result that all bod-
ies fall at the same speed, Maxwell’s demon, Einstein chasing a light 
beam, the twins paradox, Heisenberg’s microscope, Schrödinger’s cat. 
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Some of those experiments1 are analogous to deductive mathematical 
proofs, so the analogy between the empirical physics and the a priori 
mathematics reveals itself to be of quite an importance. Let us have a 
closer look at the Galileo’s experiment with the result that all bodies 
fall at the same speed (Galilei 1638).
Galileo proved, by using a thought experiment, Aristotle’s theory of 
gravity to be fl awed. According to Aristotle’s theory, objects fall at the 
speed directly proportional to their mass. More than seventeen centu-
ries later, Galileo writes:
Aristotle says that “an iron ball of one hundred pounds falling from a height 
of one hundred cubits reaches the ground before a one-pound ball that 
has fallen a single cubit.” I say that they arrive at the same time. (Galilei 
1638/1914: [109])
The proof he offers is the following one: Galileo imagines two bodies 
H and L, one (H) heavier than the other (L), that are attached one to 
another. According to Aristotle, the compound body (H + L) falls faster 
than the body H, since the compound body is heavier. It means that the 
velocity of the united bodies is bigger than the velocity of the heavier 
one: v(H + L) ≥ v(H). On the other hand, as Galileo nicely explains:
… when the small stone moves slowly it retards to some extent the speed of 
the larger, so that the combination of the two, which is a heavier body than 
the larger of the two stones, would move less rapidly … (Galilei 1638/1914: 
[109])
It follows that the velocity of the compound body should be smaller 
than the velocity of the H body: v(H + L) ≤ v(H). From the two equations 
it follows mathematically that the two velocities are equal: v(H + L) = 
v(H). Galileo’s result follows deductively from Aristotle’s presumptions. 
Even though thought experiments clearly can serve as examples of de-
ductive proofs in physics, such results are often treated as exceptions. 
The mainstream view being that:
… the methods of investigation of mathematics differ markedly from the 
methods of investigation in the natural sciences. Whereas the latter acquire 
general knowledge using inductive methods, mathematical knowledge ap-
pears to be acquired in a different way: by deduction from basic principles. 
[…] The status of mathematical knowledge also appears to differ from the 
status of knowledge in the natural sciences. The theories of the natural sci-
ences appear to be less certain and more open to revision than mathemati-
cal theories. (Horsten 2019)
3. Induction vs. universal generalization
Are thought experiments marginal exceptions to the standard methods 
of discovering the laws of physics (science), and is the view that in the 
1 On the other hand, some of the thought experiments might be viewed as 
examples of inductive logic as advocated in (Norton 1991), but we would argue that 
in those examples as in the examples of real experiments, deductive rule of universal 
generalization is at work.
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physical sciences, there is no higher authority than observation and in-
duction (Polya 1945: 117) the right view?
Let us start with another experiment, this time from chemistry.2 In 
1828 Friedrich Wöhler was trying to synthesize ammonium cyanate 
from silver cyanate and ammonium chloride and obtained a white pow-
der which he suspected was not the desired compound but could not 
test it as it was not obtainable in the pure enough form. He tried a dif-
ferent pair of chemicals, lead cyanate and ammonium hydroxide, and 
obtained what appeared to be the same white powder which he was 
now able to further analyse. What Wöhler incidentally discovered was 
an organic compound, urea,3 and he prepared it outside a living organ-
ism which was later deemed as a breakthrough discovery (at the time 
it was believed an organic compound could be obtained within living 
organisms only4).
In order to be sure of the obtained result, Wöhler should have re-
peated the same experiment over and over again in order to be able to 
fi nally conclude, inductively, that it was possible to obtain an organic 
compound outside a living organic system. Wöhler, however, would 
have considered such number of repetitions of the same experiment 
to be unnecessary. Why? Because he was aware that the experiment 
he performed was an arbitrary experiment of this type. It means that 
whatever happened in that experiment would happen in any other ex-
periment performed under same relevant conditions (say, having all 
the glassware very clean, certain temperature or pressure maintained 
etc.) and with same chemicals, and no matter where and when the ex-
periment is performed.
His inferential step was, hence, of the form: in the experiment per-
formed, the lead cyanate could be converted into urea. There was noth-
ing specifi c about the lead cyanate used, nor was the experiment per-
formed under some unusual conditions. Hence, whatever result would 
be obtained, was a general one, i.e. could be generalized as holding for 
any lead cyanate. This is the inference as far as the synthesis of urea 
goes. If one wants to further use it to disprove vitalism, that is to defend 
a general claim, that an organic substance could also be obtained outside 
2 It will be seen in the following sections how this example is easily transferred 
to modern experimental physics.
3 The equation of the chemical reaction in question is: Pb(OCN)2 + 2 NH3 + H2O 
→ PbO + NH4OCN → H2NCONH2. The last chemical formula is the formula for urea. 
4 Actually, the full history of the refutation of vitalism (the then prevalent 
doctrine that organic compounds characteristic of the living organic systems could 
only be obtained within such systems) is a bit more complex. For, although Wöhler 
did perform the very fi rst such chemical reaction of synthesis of organic molecule 
from inorganic ingredients, his ingredients originally came from living substances 
and so, some claimed, a part of vis vitalis (the living force which was actually 
responsible for producing organic stuff) could have somehow survived and affected 
the whole process. Wöhler’s student Hermann Kolbe is credited as the one who was 
able to obtain the organic substance (acetic acid which is the main ingredient of 
vinegar) in a wholly inorganic process from carbon disulfi de (Ramberg 2015).
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a living organic system, then one only needs to establish that for simil-
lar chemical reactions (like the one Wöhler’s student Kolbe performed) 
again there are no further relevant parameters or conditions which 
were not already present in Wöhler’s original experiment (if it really 
had been perfectly designed which it was not as explained in footnote 
4). Of course, one might want to test as many such reactions as possible 
to try to synthesize all the organic compounds from all the imaginable 
inorganic ingredients (which has been a larger portion of chemical re-
search since the days of Wöhler!) but that amount of effort is wholly un-
necessary in ordert to prove that at least one organic compound can be 
synthesized from inorganic substances and so to refute vitalism as well.
Now, we do not claim that all the results of experiments or all the 
discoveries in science were done by following enumerative induction, 
although for many one might believe that they were. What we do claim, 
is that all of those results that were thought of as examples of enu-
merative induction are actually examples of universal generalization. 
The art of experimentation is then chiefl y consisted of fi nding the set 
of arbitrary parameters which will allow the reproduction of the phe-
nomenon in question and not hinder its realisation, hence allowing for 
the relation between the right parameters to emerge for the observer. 
Here one can also think of further examples from physics, such as the 
discovery of Boyle’s law (of the inverse proportionality of volume to 
pressure of the gas), or gas laws in general (where there is always a 
direct relation between two parameters). Neither Boyle, nor any other 
physicist involved did think there was any need for repeating the same 
experiment over and over again. It is true that one does repeat a cer-
tain experiment testing the dependence of certain number of param-
eters several times, but not because we should be more certain of the 
result after the n-th measurement, but because we want to minimize 
the errors that will, of course, always be present, nevertheless not com-
promising the result of the measurement.
Indeed, our analysis is not limited to physics only, although we de-
liberately decided to focus more on (fundamental) physics research. An 
example from chemistry—paradigmatic for that whole science—was 
already given. One can also think of many similar examples from bi-
ology. Take for instance the most fundamental discovery that every 
living organism has genes. Once genes were discovered in many ex-
amplars of living organisms and their function determined in any one 
of them, it was certain what their function will be in the specimen of 
the yet undiscovered species. Surely no one would doubt the degree of 
confi dence of such a result. But can this degree ever be achieved by 
inductive reasoning alone?
Whenever we infer from an arbitrary situation (or object of the do-
main) to a general situation (or any object of the domain) we are ap-
plying the universal generalization, a deductive rule of inference. For-
mally we write:
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Fa ⊢∀x Fx, a ∈ 𝐷,
a is an arbitrary object of the domain (D), i.e. the name to be gener-
alised upon must occur arbitrarily.
4. How is research done in modern physics?
To re-enforce our conclusion from previous section, that the logic of 
scientifi c research in physics (and more broadly natural science) has 
nothing to do with enumerative induction, we will here consider how 
is research done in modern physics. First, the analysis will be given 
due mainly to Eugene P. Wigner (1963; 1965) of the level of knowledge 
reached and the structure of modern physics, which should shed light 
on what signifi cant changes happened already in the fi rst half of the 
twentieth century fundamental physics (meaning quantum theory, 
relativity theories and quantum fi eld theories). These changes were in 
how the theoreticians (among others Wigner himself5) changed the way 
of thinking about fundamental problems as well as the way the experi-
mentalists changed the practice of setting up experiments. Second, we 
will offer what we believe should be the Wignerian reading of a class of 
experiments, namely the reactions between particles in particle physics.
As there are many accounts (Kaplan 1998) of scientifi c induction, 
we shall here focus on enumerative induction. However, it is our plan 
to undertake an expanded study of how essentially the same critique, 
based on Wigner’s account of the structure of physics, can be used to 
argue against other types of inductive reasoning. One more caveat is 
required before proceeding further regarding the Norton’s theory of 
material induction (e.g. 2003; 2005; 2010; 2014) as induction based 
on material facts that are relevant for the inductive case at hand and 
without relying on some universal inductive schema. We fi nd Norton’s 
approach very convincing in general, but feel that one can make a step 
further and deny that there is induction at all in science. Again, this 
will be elaborated in detail in a further work.
By looking at mostly physics before the twentieth century, one 
might be excused in thinking that (1) there is not much difference be-
tween physics and any other fairly established natural science, say 
chemistry; and (2) that if the logic of physical research is not always 
enumerative induction, it is by all means inductive logic of a kind. We, 
on the other hand, strongly believe, that neither (1) or (2) is acceptable. 
Why not? Let us look at the two cases individually. Firstly, why would 
(1) not be acceptable? Modern physics, since the advent of Einstein’s 
5 Eugene P. Wigner was one of the fi rst generation of quantum theorists and 
contributed signifi cantly to research on quantum theory (applications of group 
theory to quantum mechanics) and its interpretation (especially the so called 
measurement problem) as well as to the theory (Wigner 1965) of symmetries of 
equations of physical laws which is what will mainly be of interest in this paper. For 
his contributions to fundamental research in theoretical physics he was awarded the 
Nobel prize for physics.
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relativity and quantum theory (so since the beginning of the twentieth 
century) became much more general than any other science before or 
since. We will not go so far to state that it became akin to, say, ap-
plied mathematics, but the degree of generality of the most fundamen-
tal laws of physics as well as their great reductive power (to serve as 
foundation to the laws of almost all of chemistry, and therefore much 
of biology or geology etc.) is quite alike theories in the mathematical 
sciences. Furthermore, physics in general and theoretical physics in 
particular, employs great many mathematical techniques not only in 
what might be called its computational schema, but also in the way 
physicists think about the laws of nature. One example is the require-
ment that all the laws must be given as mathematical equations of a 
sort, most often as partial differential equations. Now, there is no such 
generally pronounced, and most defi nitely not generally accepted, view 
regarding, e.g. the laws of biology, or even genetics (which is much 
more mathematical than the average branch of biological science).
Secondly, why would (2) not be acceptable? One cannot escape the 
question of whether (2) is somehow not quite the best suited account of 
the logic of physics research, once we appreciate: (a) the crucial differ-
ences between physics and other (natural) sciences, (b) the fact that its 
statements possess the degree of generality that statements of no other 
science even remotely approach, (c) how strongly mathematical its laws 
are in their character, (d) the level of abstractness of theoretical phys-
ics, (e) the philosophical nature of the deepest questions physics deals 
with, (f) the fact that we derive laws from other more general laws (of-
ten without even doing experiments to corroborate the derived laws!), 
and fi nally, (g) how we derive whole theories within physics from a 
more fundamental theory, or by linking a theory to another theor 
5. Wigner’s account of the structure of physics
Wigner in (1963) and to a lesser extent, but in more detail for some 
of the points, in (Wigner 1965), offers a very plausible account of the 
whole of physics which is based on our best fundamental theories as 
well as our landmark experiments. In fact, it can be said his account 
in the meantime became the keystone of the mainstream approach to 
discovering new laws of physics. His interpretation of physical theory 
is based on a symmetry approach to the laws of physics, a movement 
in physics research initiated by Einstein and founded on mathematics 
of Hermann Minkowski, Hermann Weyl and Emmy Noether (Rosen 
1983). After having discovered that in spite of physics not after all be-
ing able to give the spatio-temporal description of phenomena in abso-
lute terms of Newtonian system, there were still some quantities and, 
more generally, mathematical structures, which remain unaltered 
when the observer’s reference frame is changed—the so called invari-
ants, Einstein saw this as a guide for developing new theories. He saw 
what was later developed as theory of invariants under symmetry 
 M. Grba and M. Trobok, Induction vs. Universal Generalization 27
transformations as a new general framework for physics. Symmetry 
here means a transformation which preserves some structure (say a 
mathematical equation which expresses a law of physics) given certain 
change in variables (say changing the coordinates). Noether showed 
that to each so called geometrical symmetry principle there corresponds 
a law of conservation of a certain physical property (e.g. to a symme-
try transformation with respect to spatial coordinate corresponds the 
law of conservation of linear momentum). It was later shown that one 
can (in quantum theory) make like connection for other symmetries. 
Given that the laws of conservation belong to the category of the most 
abstract and universally valid laws, one can fi nd way in justifying Ein-
stein’s, at the time, bold claim that there is a symmetry approach to 
discovering the laws of nature.
Wigner stated this symmetry approach especially succinctly (and 
best in his Nobel prize winning lecture of 1963). In our research in 
physics we begin as ever with observations, more or less complex in 
nature or execution of experimental setup required to make these ob-
servations. At the next stage of the process of discovering laws there 
are certain generalizations from the observations: e.g. we abstract the 
specifi cs of the region of space and the interval of time pertaining to the 
observations made, or we abstract the material out of which the tested 
object is made etc. These fi rst-instance-generalizations Wigner calls 
correlations. The correlations might be very crude and not of great de-
gree of generality, which means that they will usually be expressed as 
mere approximations. Hence, valid only under certain conditions, say, 
Ohm’s law of resistance in electric circuits is valid only for a very lim-
ited range of temperatures and materials. We can then perform further 
experiments to test the range of certain conditions, and here we might 
as well be using inductive inference techniques, but more on that will 
follow in the next section. So let us suppress judgement on the issue at 
this point. The process of further testing and refi ning the approxima-
tions can last for quite a time, sometimes centuries (as in the case of 
trying to fi nd or refute the luminiferous ether), or for millennia (in case 
of discovering atoms!). The most important, however, is the next stage 
in development of a physical theory. And this Wigner calls the stage of 
forming the more general laws, which indeed can sometimes turn out 
to be the most general, the so called correlations of correlations. The 
laws of conservation (or, what turns out to be the same, the symmetry 
principles) are the most general example of correlations of correlations. 
We discovered each such law by the usual process of positing (hypoth-
esizing) and experimenting on a small sample and for a limited range 
of values of a certain parameter. In the end, however, we have been 
rediscovering such regularities over and over again to the point that 
nowadays practically no physicist doubts the universal validity of the 
laws of conservation.
28 M. Grba and M. Trobok, Induction vs. Universal Generalization
After we realized the general validity of the symmetry princi-
ples—and this is the crucial point in Wigner’s analysis—we are better 
equipped for discovering further laws of physics which will be of lower 
level of generality and will, therefore, depend on the symmetry prin-
ciples. This dependence is twofold:
       1. The very existence of the lower level laws depends on the exis-
tence of higher level laws, and ultimately all the laws depend 
on the most general laws, some of which will be the symmetry 
principles.
       2. The validity, or truth, of the lower level laws will depend on the 
validity of the higher level laws.
As Wigner himself explains regarding (1):
It is natural, therefore, to ask for a superprinciple which is in a similar 
relation to the laws of nature as these are to the events. The laws of nature 
permit us to foresee events on the basis of the knowledge of other events; 
the principles of invariance should permit us to establish new correlations 
between events, on the basis of the knowledge of established correlations 
between events. This is exactly what they do. If it is established that the 
existence of the events A, B, C, . . . necessarily entails the occurrence of X, 
then the occurrence of the events A’, B’, C’, . . . also necessarily entails X’, if 
A’, B’, C’, . . . and X’ are obtained from A, B, C, . . . and X by one of the invari-
ance transformations. (Wigner 1963: 10)
An example will be described in detail in the next section. It should 
also be noted that in the sense Wigner understood—and modern phys-
ics understands—invariance transformations (again, just another term 
for symmetry principles), they are to serve the purpose of a kind of 
selection principles, so allowing physicists to select among the several 
proposed possible new correlations. The one that will always be se-
lected is the one which is in accord with symmetry principles (which 
usually means, one or more conservation laws). In this sense, a pos-
sible correlation cannot be declared a law of physics—so cannot really 
exist—if it would violate a law of conservation.
As for (2), Wigner makes the following remarks:
The preceding two sections emphasized the inherent nature of the invari-
ance principles as being rigorous correlations between those correlations 
between events which are postulated by the laws of nature. This at once 
points to the use of the set of invariance principles which is surely most 
important at present: to be a touchstone for the validity of possible laws 
of nature. A law of nature can be accepted as valid only if the correlations 
which it postulates are consistent with the accepted invariance principles. 
(Wigner 1963: 12)
In other words, if we need to assume the validity of the invariance 
principle(s) in order to accept the newly proposed law as valid (or, more 
cautiously, potentially valid), so to assume more general principle in 
order to prove that the specifi c, and more particulate, law holds, it 
means we do not have inductive reasoning at play, but at least in part 
also a form of deduction. Which form, remains to be examined. What 
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we propose is that at least in some instances of reasoning in physics, or 
science, it is universal generalization.
Before we proceed to examine a typical case of such reasoning, a fur-
ther remark is required in order to complete the exposition of Wigner’s 
account of physical theory and, indeed, of physics research as such. 
Although symmetry principles are very important in physics, it would 
not be all that good if everything was symmetrical at all times. Pre-req-
uisite for even contemplating an experiment is to know (and appropri-
ately materially realize) the so called initial and boundary conditions, 
so values of parameters which are not included within the symmetry 
account of the possible situation, and so present an asymmetry of a 
sort. Only with full specifi cation of all the relevant symmetries, other 
more general laws and initial and boundary conditions might we ap-
proach discovering a new law!
6. Experiments in particle physics 
and conservation laws
The knowledge of conservation laws (symmetry principles) is of para-
mount importance for not only performing experiments but for even 
contemplating a new experiment in particle physics or nuclear phys-
ics research. What is the reason for this? It is the fact that a nuclear 
or, generally, a reaction between particles cannot take place unless all 
the relevant conservation laws are satisfi ed by the reaction. Physicists 
have, starting from around the beginning of 20th century up to today, 
discovered that a reaction between any number of any type of particles 
can in principle happen given that there is enough energy and that the 
specifi c conservation laws are satisfi ed. For each reaction there is the 
accompanying list of conservation laws6. For example, the list for the 
reaction7 of nitrogen (14N) with alpha particle (4He) which has oxygen 
(17O) and a proton (1p) for products—the famous fi rst ever nuclear trans-
formation of elements, performed in Rutherford’s team—would be:
 law of conservation of energy,
 law of conservation of momentum,
 law of conservation of angular momentum,
 law of conservation of number of baryons (this is actually easy to 
show from the equation of reaction, as 14 + 4 = 17 + 1),
 law of conservation of charge (the calculation is same as for the 
number of baryons if we assume all the particles are bare posi-
tive charges).
If any of the listed laws would be violated by what was the proposed re-
action, physicists would immediately know that the reaction would not 
6 A good and standard survey of the role of conservation laws in particle physics 
reasearch and their connection to symmetry principles is (Henley and García 2007: 
195–220).
7 The reaction equation in standard notation is: 14N + 4He → 17O + 1p.
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take place and would not even start preparing the experimental setup. 
The emphasis is on the fact that there is such a complete list for each 
imaginable reaction and that physicists can check whether a reaction 
satisfi es all the laws from the reaction-specifi c list.
Let us pause here and ask, But how can physicists know there is 
such a list? Obviously, each conservation law was discovered fi rst as a 
singular fact of observation, say, it was noticed that the law of conser-
vation of charge is valid for some chemical reactions, and later it was 
noted that it holds for nuclear reactions too, and so forth. Each time, 
however, it was valid for a particular instance of a specifi c reaction. 
The problems of inductive method of inference are already all there. 
Let us mention but a few:
The problem of repetition: How do we move from an observation valid 
for an instance of a type of experiment (a type of reaction8) to a conclu-
sion valid generally for all instances of a type of experiment? Next, 
how do we move to establishing the same conclusion (that a particular 
quantity is conserved) for a different type of experiment but within 
the same domain of experiments (reactions between particles of certain 
type)?
If we take recourse to enumerative induction to make the fi rst gen-
eralization, then the question arises, what if there appears a case of 
an instance of a reaction of a certain type (like the one above men-
tioned) for which a certain law does not appear to hold? What is the 
procedure then? We test again, but for what: to disclaim the negative 
result hitherto found, or to reconfi rm this negative result, thereby in 
effect negating that the particular law is valid for a particular type 
of reaction? It is not clear, and prima facie cannot be clear, as we, by 
embracing only inductive methods of reasoning in science, cannot ac-
cept any a priori given fact, or any deductively posited fact. We believe 
the method here—and in practice of physics (or for similar situations 
in other sciences) might rather be universal generalization. It makes 
much more sense, for the reason it avoiding the aforementioned dilem-
ma and also for it immediately being clear how to generalize not only 
to other instances of the same type of experiment, but also to similar 
types of experiments (other reactions of different particles or particle 
type). Taking the other instance of one type of reaction or changing for 
a reaction between different particles but of the same type of reaction, 
or switching to another type of reaction is just another arbitrary name 
to generalize upon.
The problem of generalization: Moreover, if the method of inferring is 
allowed to be from the range of deductive methods, then it is by no 
means unusual that we should be guided by other deductively inferred 
8 By a type of reaction it is roughly meant any reaction between a certain 
type of particles (e.g. a nuclear reaction is between nuclei, decay processes are 
transformations between nucleons, or constituents of a nucleus, etc.).
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facts. Such as the fact that symmetry principles are used across the dis-
ciplines of physics, that they can guide research in physics in general 
(as Einstein and a battalion of fi rst class physicists have been showing 
for over a hundred years now) and that there is a universally (and 
mathematically precisely) established connection between symmetry 
principles and conservation laws (Noether’s famous theorems). Finally, 
as Wigner reasoned, we actually assume the universally valid conser-
vation laws—and a reaction-specifi c list—each time we embark on test-
ing another possible reaction between particles, or probing matter at a 
higher energy level, or trying to fi nd a new particle (which is always a 
product in some particle reaction), most recently (in 2012) Higgs boson 
particle. If any of the laws on a reaction-specifi c list of conservation 
laws is violated by such a reaction, we know in advance of actually 
performing the reaction that it will not go.
The aprioricity of knowledge: If induction is the whole story behind rea-
soning in science, there really cannot be any talk of a priori knowledge 
of facts or laws, or theorems. There is always the problem of validat-
ing our inferences based on such assumptions and without deductive 
techniques admitted on the same footing with inductive ones. Take the 
last claim we made in the previous paragraph, that we can know in 
advance whether a reaction will go. It might seem innocent enough, in-
deed a practicing nuclear or particle physicist does not give it a second 
thought in a day-to-day laboratory work. But what a claim it is! We can 
know whether something will happen in advance of it happening—and 
we can know it with certainty, if it will or will not happen! But, making 
inferences by induction only, we could never reach such certainty!
Moreover, think of how we actually got to this claim: at the very 
fi rst we observed a singular fact for an instance of a particular nuclear 
reaction; then we assumed it for all such nuclear reactions; then we 
generalized that a discovered correlation (a law of conservation) is val-
id for all reactions in nuclear physics; then we found same law holds 
for an instance of a reaction between some particles beyond the domain 
of nuclear transformations, so for a reaction in particle physics; then 
we generalized for all reactions in particle physics. Finally, we do not 
anymore question the validity of the discovered law of conservation 
at hand, or, for that matter, of any of the conservation laws: no one 
actually anymore investigates the validity of conservation laws in par-
ticle physics, they are ASSUMED, indeed so much so, that no planned 
experiment will ever go operational if only one of the laws from the 
reaction-specifi c list is found to be just theoretically violated by a reac-
tion in question. As Wigner said, symmetry principles (or conservation 
laws) are to be regarded as a touchstone for the validity of possible laws 
of nature.
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7. Conclusion
Starting with analysis of an example of a thought experiment which 
uses a deductive rule of inference and moving through examples from 
basic physics and chemistry to, fi nally, paradigmatic example of experi-
ments in modern particle physics, we are drawn to conclusion that a 
large and signifi cant portion of physics (science) is deductive in nature. 
We tried to demonstrate that what were previously thought as prime 
examples of application of (enumerative) induction in physics or chem-
istry can best be interpreted as examples of application of universal 
generalization inference rule. Furthermore, and by relying on an elabo-
rate analysis of Eugene P. Wigner (one of the pioneers of quantum and 
nuclear physics as well as one of the foremost theoretical physicists of 
his generation), we showed that a deductive schema of guiding the re-
search in physics is really the most appropriate to at least fundamental 
parts of that science. It is our aim to review other main purported induc-
tive schemas and to compare with our own approach in the near future.
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